By "folk psychology" I mean the commonsense understanding and deployment of mentalistic concepts, especially the propositional attitudes. Three (or four) principal questions are of interest in the study of folk psychology: (Q1) How do ordinary people understand, or represent to themselves, the various mental states? That is, what are the contents of their concepts of the mental states? (Q2) How do they go about attributing these states? This question decomposes into two subquestions: (Q2)(A) how do people attribute such states to others, and (Q2)(B) how do they attribute such states to themselves? (3) How do people acquire their concepts of mental states and their skill at applying these concepts? The study of folk psychology is the attempt to answer these questions, an attempt which should be (and is) a combined effort among philosophers and cognitive scientists. Large literatures on the topic already exist in both philosophy and developmental psychology, and other branches of cognitive and neuroscience also have much to contribute.
wholly unrelated, of course. The content of mental-state concepts may constrain how these concepts can be plausibly deployed in attribution, and evidence about their contents can be obtained by inquiring into their manner of deployment. Which attributional operations are used is (evidentially) relevant to what the contents of the concepts might be.
II.
The first problem I shall explore is how the three positions on the table should be defined. This is a non-trivial exercise. Within each position--especially TT and ST--different adherents characterize their approaches differently, even when they share the same label. It is standardly assumed that the three approaches are disjoint, but some definitions might imply otherwise.
Finally, the possible features that might be used in defining any of the positions are quite varied.
A given approach might be defined in terms of its answer to (Q1), its answer(s) to (Q2) (both (A) and (B)), its answer to (Q3), or by some combination of such answers.
Theory theory. At least two distinct forms of TT are on offer: a strict and a loose version.
The strict version--essentially equivalent to analytical functionalism--says that the commonsense understanding of mental states is wholly in terms of their place in a folk-psychological theory. A theory is construed as a substantial set of laws or generalizations, in the present case, laws connecting various mental states with other mental states, with external circumstances, and with overt behaviors. This version of TT is presented, for example, by David Lewis (1972) and Paul Churchland (1988) . Churchland gives a sampling of the folk generalizations or platitudes of the type in question, including: "Persons tend to feel pain at points of recent bodily damage," "Persons denied fluids for some time tend to feel thirst," "Persons in pain tend to want to relieve that pain," and "Persons who want that P, and believe that Q would be sufficient to bring about P, and have no conflicting wants or preferred strategies, will try to bring it about that Q." (1988: 58-59) TT suggests that ordinary people's concepts of mental states are exhausted by their understanding of the roles these postulated states play within such a set of laws.
ii ii Notice that TT cannot be distinctively characterized as the metaphysical thesis that mental states have functional properties, or even have them essentially. It is mainly the conceptual (or semantic) thesis--that the concepts of mental states are specified by their functional roles--that Defenders of ST have challenged the strict version of TT by raising doubts about whether all mentalistic attributors possess the sorts of generalizations or platitudes that are usually invoked (Gordon 1986; Heal 1986; Goldman 1989) . Mentalistic attributors include children under age (say) six, whose putative knowledge (whether explicit or implicit) of such laws is especially open to question. In light of these challenges, perhaps, certain defenders of TT soften their commitments by omitting any requirement of laws or generalizations. Stich and Nichols (1992) opt for a loose version of TT (what they call a "wide" interpretation), formulated as follows: "just about any internally stored body of information about a domain [is] an internally represented theory of that domain " (1992: 46) . This is a somewhat tendentious definition of TT, however, because it implies that a position ascribing to attributors any information about mental states is an instance of TT. This definition threatens to swallow up virtually all opposition, by counting only extremely radical positions as part of the opposition at all. This is not a fruitful way to divide up the available options, because it lumps almost every position into a single category.
If we want to avoid the definition-by-laws characterization of TT, but not be so loose as the Stich-Nichols definition, how might TT be characterized? The historical motivation behind TT was to provide an account of mental concepts that fits with traditional empiricist notions of cognitive or semantic respectability.
iii The construal of theoretical terms in science was the model on which TT was patterned. So one component of the core conception of TT is that the content of mental concepts should be empirically definable, where this means that the basic terms of the definitions should refer to publicly observable events. iv Indeed, it is common for distinguishes TT from alternative positions. Thus, Jerry Fodor embraces the metaphysical thesis of functionalism but rejects conceptual, or semantic, functionalism: "[D]enying, as a point of semantics, that "believe" has a functional definition is compatible with asserting, as a point of metaphysics, that belief has a functional essence. " (1998: 8) iii It is noteworthy that the first statement of TT was in Wilfrid Sellars's paper "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (Sellars 1963 ).
iv I here make the working assumption that the contents of people's mental-state concepts come in the form of definitions. This assumption is quite controversial, of course, in the philosophical and cognitive science literatures. However, I only make this as a working assumption, and mean proponents of TT to remark that mental states are "unobservables" and must be understood by their relations to observables. The psychologists Alison Gopnik and Henry Wellman write: "All these characteristics of theories ought also to apply to children's understanding of mind, if such understandings are theories of mind. That is, such theories should involve appeal to abstract unobservable entities, with coherent relations among them" (1992: 148, emphasis added).
As our discussion of functionalism indicates, TT standardly appeals to specific sorts of publicly observable events to which an understanding of mental states is tied, viz., the subject's behavior and stimulus conditions in her environment. These are, of course, the sorts of observables to which (logical) behaviorism traditionally appealed, and functionalism is a direct descendant of behaviorism. Thus, TT endorses the idea that an understanding of mental states is founded on appropriate logical and/or epistemological relations to publicly observable peripheral events. TT thereby avoids any reliance on "qualitative" or introspectible properties, which scientific empiricists characteristically regard as either epistemologically suspect, metaphysically dangerous (as a threat to physicalism), or both. Tying mental-state concepts to purely peripheral events effects a purely third-person conception of mentality, a perspective congenial to traditional empiricism because it avoids epistemologically problematic issues of "privacy".
If mentalistic concepts are grasped in terms of peripheral observables and their relata, there follows a natural-seeming answer to question (Q2). People go about the business of attributing mental states by inferring such states from observed peripheral events in accordance with the theoretical connections, i.e., the laws allegedly known to folk attributors. This is the standard TT story about mental attributions to others; and paradigmatic proponents of TT endorse the same story about self-attribution of mental states (Gopnik 1993 A different way to configure TT is to drop the second part and replace it with some constraint on the account of concept acquisition. TT might be characterized as holding that the child's formulation and grasp of MS concepts results from general-purpose scientizing procedures (in this case, processes of concept formation). This characterization would fit with the views of Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) , for example, and Gopnik and Wellman (1992) . This definition, however, would exclude developmentalists of the modularist or nativist persuasion (Leslie 1991; Leslie and German 1995; Baron-Cohen 1995) , who have typically presented themselves as proponents of TT. These psychologists reject the "child scientist" account of MSconcept acquisition.
v Rationality theory. RT partly derives from Quine's (1960) articulation of a principle of charity in the context of his approach to "radical translation". Variants of his charity principle v Another interesting question in the definition of TT is whether an approach that drops the peripheralist-empiricist constraint but retains the nomological inference account of attribution should qualify as a version of TT. Consider an account that configures MS-concepts in terms of directly introspectible (or internally detectable) features rather than publicly observable, peripheral evemts. Using these concepts people acquire nomological beliefs (based solely on evidence about their own case) relating introspectible events to one another and to behavior. Using these laws, they make inferences (whether justified or not) to mental states of other people. Would such a position qualify as a specimen of TT?
have been endorsed by others, most prominently by Davidson (1984) and Dennett (1987) , as an account of how attributors "interpret" others, i.e., assign intentional states to them. The core idea is that attributors make assumptions about the normative propriety of having certain intentional states under various conditions. Rationality is assumed to impose certain requirements on the propositional attitudes a person should have. For example, (1) rationality requires agents to believe truths; (2) it requires their belief-sets to be coherent; (3) it requires their belief-sets to be closed under entailment; and (4) it requires their desires to be aimed at things it is good for them to have. Interpretation proceeds by making the charitable assumption that people usually comply with these normative principles. That is, attributors allegedly assign intentional states on the assumption that their targets mostly conform with these dictates of rationality. vi Thus, according to RT, normative principles of rationality guide the process of intentional attribution in roughly the way nomological generalizations allegedly guide attribution according to (strict versions of)
TT. According to Dennett, for example, to adopt the "intentional stance" toward people (or other systems) consists in assigning intentional states to them in accordance with a default assumption that they conform with principles of rationality.
On the surface RT is a theory of attribution, a response to question (Q2 A second possible answer might appeal to the general idea of the intentional strategy. This is suggested by Dennett in the following passage:
[A]ll there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behavior is reliably predictable via the intentional strategy, and hence all there is to really and truly believing that p ... is being an intentional system for which p occurs as a belief in the best ( Coming from the opposite direction, when defenders of RT are pressed on the question of exactly which rationality postulates are utilized, they sometimes fall back into a position indistinguishable from simulationism. I'll return to this point below.
What about ST itself? What are its core commitments? The distinctive element of simulationism is its answer to (Q2)(A), concerning third-person MS attribution. The standard ST position is that one makes attributions by putting oneself in the target's shoes and modeling her resultant mental activity (Gordon 1986; Goldman 1989) . More precisely, one creates "pretend"
states of oneself intended to correspond to initial states of the target. Next one feeds these pretend states into a cognitive mechanism of one's own--e.g., a practical or factual reasoning mechanism--and lets it operate on inputs so as to produce a new state, for example, a decision or a belief. Finally, one attributes this newly outputted state to the target. Some simulationists, however, take exception to this depiction. Specifically, Heal (1998) prefers to characterize the simulation account as holding that the attributor must "co-cognize" with the target, but that cocognition need not involve feeding pretend states into cognitive mechanisms.
Simulationists disagree even more sharply about the method of first-person MS attribution. I endorse an introspectivist or direct monitoring approach to first-person (contemporaneous) MS attribution (Goldman 1993, forthcoming). Gordon rejects such an account and opts for an ascent-routine story (Gordon 1992 (Gordon , 1995 (Gordon , 1996 , which will be examined below. Analogous differences persist on the topic of the contents of MS concepts. Thus, simulationists share common ground only on the third-person attribution question, and even on that question, unanimity is far from perfect.
III.
In this section I shall briefly present some serious problems facing TT and RT. These criticisms do not purport to be definitive--that would be too much to expect for the complexity of the subject and the limits of space. But they are major stumbling blocks for the rivals of ST, which help tilt me and should tilt others toward ST. I begin with problems for RT.
The first problem facing RT is its failure to address an entire subclass of the mental states, viz., the sensations. The sensations are surely understood and attributed by the folk; but since there appear to be no questions of "rationality" pertaining to pains or tickles, for example, RT comes up empty in trying to explain how attributors ascribe them.
A second problem for RT is the implausibility of either of its approaches to attitude concepts. The first approach, recall, is to analyze these concepts in terms of the posited norms of rationality. An initial problem with this approach is a threat of circularity. The second possible RT approach to attitude concepts, floated in the previous section, is to say that the attitudes are understood in terms of their predictive utility when adopting the viii For a recent example, see Brandom (1994) .
intentional stance. According to this account, however, possessing the belief concept or the desire concept would require one to possess the concept of the intentional strategy. Is this plausible? Does everyone who attributes belief or desire (and therefore possesses these concepts) also possess the concept of the intentional strategy? Notice that this concept is a highly reflective one. It requires a possessor not only to be a user of the intentional strategy but to understand, reflectively, what that strategy consists in. But according to developmental psychologists (e.g., Bartsch and Wellman 1995) , two-year-olds use the desire concept and threeyear-olds use the belief concept. So, according to the present approach, two-and three-year-olds must possess the concept of making-reliable-predictions-via-the-intentional-strategy. This consequence is hard to swallow.
A different type of problem for RT concerns the specifics of its rationality norms and the questionable grasp of those norms by ordinary people, even children. As mentioned above, quite young children show substantial mastery of attribution skills in their attitude ascriptions.
According to RT, then, these children must understand and grasp the canons of rationality that RT postulates. Is it really plausible to suppose that they grasp the general notions of logical consistency and deductive closure? Actually, it is doubtful whether even untrained adults grasp these notions. Many scientific studies of deductive reasoning challenge the notion that untrained adults approach such tasks with abstract semantical or proof-theoretic concepts of the sorts used in formal logic (Cheng and Holyoak 1985, Cosmides 1989) . Similarly, psychological studies of decision and choice challenge the notion that naive people utilize standard normative models (Tversky and Kahneman 1986) .
When challenged by worries of these sorts, Dennett often backs away from the logicbased rules that he and other RT proponents had previously postulated. One should not "cling", he says, "to the ideals of Intro Logic for one's model of rationality " (1987: 96 x Dennett goes on (1987: 100-101) to consider an even clearer formulation of ST (using the very term "simulation"), and argues that it collapses into TT. His argument rests on the claim that simulation could only work by relying on a theory. But this is incorrect, as I argue elsewhere (Goldman 1989) . While simulation could, of course, be "theory driven", it also could be "process driven", i.e., driven by psychological processes rather than a theory. The interesting and proper interpretation of ST is that it postulates intensive use of process-driven simulation.
or organism (see Schiffer 1987: 20-22 of which is in turn associated with a comparably complex functional role. The upshot for epistemic purposes is an inferential holism posing a severe threat of computational intractability (Goldman 1993).
To avert these problems, a more plausible theory would say that self-attribution occurs by internally detecting some properties of mental-state tokens that are (A) categorical (i.e., nondispositional) and (B) non-relational (at least not massively relational in the way that functionalrole properties are). There are two types of candidates for such properties: phenomenological and non-phenomenological properties. The language of thought, for example, presumably has non-phenomenological characteristics that meet conditions (A) and (B), and these characteristics might be the ones directly detected in identifying the content components of mental states. xi In the past (Goldman 1993) I flirted with the idea that the pertinent properties are phenomenological--at least for the non-content components of mental states. xii In the present paper, I mean to remain neutral on this issue. I mean to endorse only the direct detection of some such properties, whether or not they are phenomenological.
It is noteworthy that some long-time proponents of TT, viz., Nichols and Stich (forthcoming), now endorse a similar model, thereby abandoning the core TT answer to question (Q2)(B). They call their theory the "Monitoring Mechanism Theory", and contrast it with TT.
However, they don't seem to appreciate the full implications of this approach. They adopt the standard boxological story of the attitudes, according to which beliefs are depicted as states "residing" in certain boxes. The standard lore on boxes (which they follow) is that box talk is merely short-hand for talk about functional roles. If this is correct, the properties that qualify a state as a belief, a desire, or an intention are not categorical or non-relational. So the NicholsStich story does not escape the computational problems mentioned above.
What about TT's approach to third-person attribution? I'll be quite brief here, and I'll center my comments around the "frame problem" that Jane Heal (1996) has helpfully introduced in this context. xiii Begin with the assumption that adults are pretty proficient at predicting the reasoning of other adults on the persistence or nonpersistence of various states of affairs over time. If a familiar type of change takes place in the world, adults will draw conclusions about what will change and what will remain the same in the next time period. Furthermore, if these are prosaic real-world scenarios, Sandy will be reasonably competent at predicting the xi The question of content attribution is greatly complicated by issues concerning externalism about content. There is no room in this paper to take up those issues, which in any case are somewhat tangential to the problems addressed here.
xii My discussion may have encouraged an interpretation under which attitude contents were also supposed to be phenomenologically detectable; but that was not my intention.
xiii However, Heal's discussion formulates the frame problem in very general terms, whereas I shall try to stick to its original, somewhat narrower, set of concerns.
conclusions Mandy will draw about such scenarios. Is it plausible that Sandy's mindreading of Mandy is guided by a theory of such reasoning that Sandy knows?
If Sandy really has such knowledge, she is way ahead of, or at least in the same league with, the most astute practitioners of Artificial Intelligence, who have wrestled with this knotty problem without reaching much consensus (Lormand 1999 linguists have yet accomplished. But there it is plausible to suppose that a dedicated, specialpurpose module is at work. Is it comparably plausible that there is a special-purpose module for developing theories specifically about the causal reasoning powers of other people?
An entirely different account of mindreading in this domain seems far more promising, xiv In the "Yale Shooting Problem," for example, Hanks and McDermott (1986) explore the following case. Let a system assume by default that (1) live creatures remain alive and (2) loaded guns remain loaded. Confront it with this information: Fred is alive, then a gun is loaded, then, after a delay, the gun is fired at Fred. If assumption (2) is in force through the delay, Fred probably vioates (1). But equally, if assumption (1) is in force after the shooting, the gun probably violates (2). Why is (2) the more natural assumption to enforce?
viz., that when Sandy seeks to predict Mandy's inferences about changes and nonchanges, she (Sandy) goes through the target inferences on her own and expects Mandy to reach the same conclusions as she does. This, of course, is precisely what ST postulates. Sandy does these reasoning tasks as well as Mandy, and presumably in the very same fashion. If she uses the simulation heuristic to predict Mandy's results, she doesn't need a theory about how the task is executed.
The same point can be made with a related example: counterfactual reasoning.
Philosophers first identified the problem of counterfactual reasoning only in the 1940s or so, and only by 1970 (roughly) were moderately adequate theories developed (e.g., Lewis 1973 ).
Presumably, however, ordinary people living in earlier periods were reasonably competent at predicting and explaining other people's feats of counterfactual reasoning. Doesn't it stretch credulity to suppose that they had a folk theory of such reasoning at times when philosophers had little if any inkling that there was even a problem in this territory?
IV.
In this final section I turn to my own favored approach, ST, and to some slight specifics of its configuration, especially as pertains to question (Q1). There is broad agreement among simulationists as to how ST answers (Q2)(A), the question of third-person attribution. There is far less agreement about how it should answer (Q1) or (Q2)(B). It seems natural, moreover, for positions on the latter two questions to be intertwined. For example, if one accepts the direct detection account of first-person (current) attribution, it is not unnatural to suppose that mentalstate concepts involve some sort of categorical features or characteristics that are epistemically identifiable via direct, internal detection. This is the kind of view I have advocated elsewhere (Goldman 1993, forthcoming) . This view, with its strong Cartesian or semi-Cartesian flavor, contrasts with another major tradition in philosophy of mind, rooted in the writings of Wittgenstein, which places overt behavior at the center of all comprehension of the mind.
Another simulationist, Robert Gordon, takes a very different tack from mine, clearly along behaviorist lines. Gordon (1996, unpublished) contends that self-attribution relies, not on introspection or inner detection, but on what he calls ascent routines. The way adults ordinarily determine whether or not they believe that p, he says, is simply to ask themselves the question whether or not p. If someone were to ask me whether I believe Mickey Mouse has a tail, I would ask myself "Does Mickey Mouse have a tail?". If my answer to this latter question is "yes", then my presumptive answer to the belief-question will also be "yes". Gordon calls this an "ascent routine" because it answers a question at the mental level by answering another question pitched at what he considers a "lower" level (Gordon 1996: 15) . He claims that this enables one to answer a seemingly "internal" question by means of anwering an "outward-looking" question (unpublished: 3). To find out about one's own mental states, he thinks, one does not consult "internal" information but "external" information. This discussion confirms my earlier proposal, viz., that the story of first-person present mental-state attribution should assign a salient role to the direct inner detection of some sorts of internal features or characteristics. If we now try to apply this result to question (Q1) on our list, it looks as if the concepts of mental states should somehow be composed of the relevant sorts of internally detectable properties that would account for first-person attribution. This proposal immediately runs into trouble on both empirical and philosophical grounds. There is empirical evidence, which fits with suggestions of Wittgenstein, that infants (under one year) have a sensitivity to certain patterns of movement associated with intentionality, agency, or goaldirectedness. According to Premack (1990) and Gergeley et al. (1995) , the core notion of intentionality is triggered in young children by perceptual patterns suggestive of self-propelled motion or motion with respect to a potential goal. Baron-Cohen (1995) seconds Premack's idea by positing an "intentionality detector", alleged to be an innate endowment for reading mental states off of behavior (1995: 32). As described by Baron-Cohen, the intentionality detector interprets almost anything that propels itself or makes a non-random sound as an agent with goals and desires (1995: 34) . xv But if goal possession is stimulated by external motion or xv Some aspects of these ideas are challenged by a study of Woodward (forthcoming). The idea of dual, or multiple, representations of a single type of object, state, or category is quite common in cognitive science. For example, people might represent a single sortal in terms of both shape and function; and they may deploy representations utilizing different cognitive codes or modalities. Thus, Biederman (1987) proposes that visual object-classification commonly proceeds by means of shape-coded object types. In visually identifying something as
Woodward found that 9-month-olds differentiated between movements of grasping a toy and movements of merely letting the back of one's hand drop onto a toy. In other words, by nine months of age infants selectively encode certain goal-related properties and not others; and this selective encoding appears to begin at roughly five months. So infants don't seem to attribute goal-directedness indiscriminately to any motion of a self-propelled entity. However, these sorts of qualifications still leave in place the fundamentally behavioral character of the cues used for third-person goal-state detection.
a piano or a lamp, one exploits a stored model or prototype of what pianos or lamps look like. In addition, there are separate, modality-neutral codes representing pianos and lamps in terms of their functions, e.g., "keyboard musical instrument" and "portable source of (artificial) light".
Some pairs of matching representations are especially striking. Meltzoff and Moore (1983) discovered that infants as young as forty-two minutes can imitate the facial gestures of another person. These newborns apparently represent their own facial movements
proprioceptively--after all, they have not previously seen their own faces. They produce facial movements of their own that mimic those of a target, so they must somehow match representations of their own movements to representations of the target's facial gestures (Meltzoff 1999 xvi In this case, of course, the infants' "matching" representations are not representations of numerically the same action, only similar actions (their own and that of the observed target).
xvii Elisabeth Pacherie (1998) argues that the cross-modal matching must be between motor and visual representations rather than proprioceptive and visual representations. This fits the hypothesis I shall advance below even better.
To develop my conjecture further, I now turn to the recently discovered phenomenon of so-called "mirror neurons". xviii An interesting class of premotor neurons were initially discovered in macaque monkeys, neurons that discharge both when the monkey performs an action and when it observes another individual making a similar action (Rizzolatti et al. 1988) . The discharge of these neurons is not correlated with individual movements, but rather with general types of actions, especially grasping, holding, tearing, poking, and manipulating. So these neurons seem to code motor representations of goal-directed actions involving objects. Mirrorneuron activity, then, is apparently a neural correlate of plans or goals for action. Mirror neurons are also triggered, however, when an observer watches a target agent act toward a goal. This correspondence, or "mirroring", between observed and executed actions is sometimes described in terms of the metaphor of physical "resonance" (Rizzolatti et al., in press arising from an impairment of inhibitory control that normally governs motor plans. Apparently, when observing someone else perform an action, a normal human generates a "resonant" plan or image of doing that action himself. This plan is normally inhibited so that it does not yield motor output; but such inhibition is impaired in the relevant patient population.
Vittorio Gallese and I (Gallese and Goldman 1998) have cited resonance phenomena as possible evidence for, or a precursor of, mental simulation. Here I mean to invoke them for the twin purposes sketched above: (1) to explain how there could be a "matching" between internal and external representations of (what is conceived of as) the same state, and (2) to explain how a child might come to interpret others as undergoing internal experiences of desiring or planning similar to her own.
It is easy to see how mirror-neuron (MN) activity could facilitate the establishment of a correspondence between internal and behavioral formats for representing mental states. MN activity involves inner events associated with goal possession, desire, or planning. Externally triggered MN activity involves the observation of behavior and environmental circumstances (i.e., the presence of a goal object) associated with goal possession. So when one undergoes externally triggered MN activity, there is a (roughly) simultaneous occurrence of observed behavior and detectable inner events that might come to be linked or associated with one another.
To be sure, the observed behavior is the behavior of another creature. How might a learner come to link certain inner experience in himself with the behavior of another? The learner is in a position to notice that the same sorts of inner experience occurs when he himself prepares to execute an action. This is because MN activity serves the primary function (along with other neuron groups in the premotor cortex) of preparing to execute an action. When MN activity is externally driven, the action is not actually executed; it is inhibited. But the appropriate sort of action is executed by the person being observed. So the learner might get the idea--perhaps is even "hard-wired" to get the idea--that inner events of the type he undergoes while watching the other's behavior are also undergone by the observed actor. This would be no more remarkable than the matching of visual and proprioceptive ( 
